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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

There are four main questions of law presented by this
appeal:
1 •

Is a party to a stipulation which in major part

limits the height of a barrier wall between adjoining properties,
precluded from enforcing such restrictions against subsequent
barriers erected along the boundary between their properties in
excess of the height limitations?
2.

Is the erection of a fence under the circumstances

of this case a nuisance?

This is a case of first impression for

spite fence nuisance in Utah.

The court has an opportunity to

clearly set forth the law.
3.

Did the trial court properly exercise itfs

discretion in the administration of the proceedings and the
admission of evidence; specifically, did the court prejudically
err in excluding evidence offered by the defendant?
4.

Is the injunctive relief granted by the court

restricting barriers in excess of the stipulated height of the
wall between the residence of the parties, precluded by
Constitutional prohibitions against taking property without
compensation?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

All but one of the defendants1 numerous arguments and
issues hinge on two dominant preceptions of the case and the law.
These two views are, first, that the case involves the issue of an
implied easement to light and air, and second that the court
improperly excluded evidence.

The final argument questions the

constitutionality of the injunction imposed by court.
1.

The plaintiff's case was plead, proved and argued

on the theories of contract and nuisance.

As the defendant

conceeds there are no Utah cases concerning implied easements for
light and air.

The defendants presume the Law in Utah to be

similar to that of the majority of other jurisdictions: that there
is no implied right to light and air.

Defendants then argue that

this presumption is supreme over other law applicable to the case.
The defendants contend that both contracts in which
restrictions on light and air may be implied from the express
contract terms, and a nuisance which is based in part on
interference with light and air must yield to the supposed
prohibition to implied rights to light and air.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that the established law
of contract interpretation provides for a determination that an
express agreement may, by implication, include prohibitions
against activities that restrict light and air that are not
individually stated.

Defendants conceed that an easement may be
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created by express grant.

Similarly, plaintiffs respond that a

nuisance is a broad category of objectionable activites which
limit other property rights an individual may acquire by deed or
contract.
To have instructed the jury that a right to light and
air could not be implied would have misstated the law of contracts
and nuisance.
2.

The second major view of the case presented by

several of the defendants1 arguments is that the defendants were
precluded from presenting the evidence for their case at trial.
The body of this brief will demonstrate that this is not true but
rather that the defendants were allowed to proceed and did present
evidence to support all of the defenses that they argued.

Thus,

if there was error, which is not admitted, it was harmless.
3.

The final argument presented by the defendants

concerns the constitutionality of the injunctive relief granted.
The relief ordered was primarily corrective; ordering the removal
of the barriers found to be in violation of the stipulation and a
nuisance.

To a lesser extent the relief ordered was prescriptive;

ordering the defendants to cease erecting "similar barriers11.
The plaintiffs argue that the court's order merely
restated the findings as to the meaning of original stipulation
and the law of nuisance and is not beyond the normal power of a
court to enforce it's orders and set forth the findings and the
law.

-3-

The defendants cite no Utah authority for their
position that the injunction is a taking where the prescribed
activity is a nuisance, or prohibited by contract.

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
The defendants' statement of the case and facts is
fairly adequate for the court1s understanding of the dispute
except for the following omitted matters:
1. Upon questioning at trial all parties agreed they
had no prior disputes or problems and considered each other good
neighbors until the wall was planned by the defendant, Mark
Gallegos.

(Mrs. Behunin, T-336; Mr. Behunin, T-438; Mrs.

Gallegos, T-447; Mr. Gallegos, T-494)

At trial the plaintiff,

Mrs. Behunin testified that the defendant, Mark Gallegos told her
he intended to construct a cinderblock wall ten (10) feet high
along the entire length of the property line and that she would
need her lights on night and day (T-339).

Mrs. Gallegos testified

that Mr. Gallegos threated to build the wall MForty feet tall, not
ten11 (T-448, 449). The wall would have created a concrete
obstruction two feet, two inches from the kitchen window; one
foot, seven inches from the bedroom window; and one foot eleven
inches from the bathroom window of the plaintiffs1 home (T-427 429).
2.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Behunin testified that

subsequently she was contacted by Mr. Gallegos by telephone and
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told, "Well I'm going up with that wall and itfs going to be dark
in there and your1re going to have to leave your lights clear on
all dayM (T-341).
3.

The plaintiffs obtained an attorney and filed a

complaint and obtained a restraining order to stop the wall
(T-343).

The affidavits, complaint and answers to interrogatories

emphasized the concern for loss of their view and light because of
the anticipated height of the wall (T-356-359, Pleadings and
Exhibits 54-P, 55-P).
4.

The stipulation, (Exhibit 53-P) resolving the

dispute over the proposed wall was negotiated at a time when both
parties were represented by counsel and was executed by both
parties1 counsel (T-355 and T-452).

The stipulation clarified the

location and limited the height of the wall.
(5)

Almost immediately upon completion of the

stipulated lower wall, the defendants placed 4 x 8 foot pieces of
plywood on end against the wall directly in line with the
plaintiffs1 windows (T-361-363).

These unpainted plywood boards

remained rattling (T-365) and blocking the plaintiff's light and
I
view (T-357, 358) until after the plaintiffs commenced the lawsuit
(T-365).

An eight foot high partition replacing the 4 x 8 plywood

boards, was placed against the wall in 1982.
wood and green fiberglass (T-366).

It was built from

This partition also blocked

the light requiring the Plaintiffs lights to be on all the time
(T-371) and blocked their view (T-395 and 383, Exhibits P-2, P-3,
P-5 and P-6).
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(6)

After the wall was completed the parties

relationship was not good (T-374).

The defendants' placed signs

in their windows facing the plaintiffs1 home.
alternately stated "Nosy JoseyM or
Exhibits P-8 and P-11).

These signs

,f

Nosy Rosey" (T-376-378,

The defendant often came into his yard

when the plaintiffs were outside and made obscene gestures to them
(T-375).

On the barrier fence that was erected by the defendant

between the property line at the sidewalk and their home, the
defendant, Mr. Gallegos wrote in white spray paint, "Fence
Inspector" (T-375, Exhibit P-13, T-515).
(7)

The court was presented with testimony attempting

to show acts of the plaintiffs that were alleged to consist of
unwarranted intrusion into the defendants affairs.

Over 35 pages

of such allegations were presented by defendants through three
witnesses and their own testimony.

Acts alleged included calling

the police, looking over the wall, coming to the front yard to see
who was at the defendants1 front door, making obscene gestures,
watching construction in defendants' yard from the plaintiffs1
roof, and watering and digging near the walL.

By way of rebuttal

the plaintiffs presented the testimony of one neighbor and one
police officer as well as their own testimony.

All testimony was

limited to individual observations or knowledge.
explained that they

minded their own business.

The plaintiffs1
(The numerous

factual references for the specific testimony and objections are
contained in the body of the brief under Point III.)
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(7)

The evidence also showed that the defendants had

only one front room window on the east side of their house facing
the plaintiffs1 home (T-484 and 515) and that their yard extended
to the west over a large distance which was unrestricted and
available for improvements and use (T-486), and that the entire
remaining perimeter of their property was fenced with a 6 foot
high chain link fence (Exhibit D-37, T-507).

ARGUMENT
I.
THE BARRIERS ERECTED BY THE DEFENDANTS WERE A BREACH OF THE
STIPULATION WHEREBY THE PARTIES INTENDED TO LIMIT THE HEIGHT OF
BARRIERS ALONG THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THEIR PROPERTIES.
A primary concern of the plaintiffs, beginning with the
defendants1 declaration to build a 10 foot high wall and included
in all pleadings and discussions was the height of the wall and
the loss of their view and light.

This concern about the height

of the wall was incorporated into the restrictions of the
stipulation as to the height of the wall.

The stipulation

provided at Paragraph 4 in part.
"4. It is agreeable to the Plaintiffs that
the Defendants be allowed to construct a
cinderblock wall in accord with the
dimensions hereinafter set out along the
Western Boundary of Plaintiffs1 property,
(the Eastern boundary of Defendants1
property). This wall is to be placed upon
the foundation which was constructed by
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Defendants prior to the institution of this
action against Defendants. The wall will
be constructed of standard size and quality
cinderblock. It shall commence on the
Northwest corner of Plaintiffs1 property
and thence run in a southerly direction
along the Western boundary line of
Plaintiffs1 property (the Eastern boundary
line of Defendants' property) and shall be
of a height not to exceed 4 feet including
proper capping material. It shall continue
at a height not exceeding 4 feet to the
Northwest corner of Plaintiffs1 residence.
At the Northwest corner of Plaintiffs1
residence, the wall shall be increased to a
height not to exceed 5 feet including
proper capping material, and shall continue
at a height not exceeding 5 feet until it
reaches the Southwest corner of Plaintiffs'
residence. At the Southwest corner of
Plaintiffs' residence, the wall shall be
increased to a height not exceeding 7 feet
including proper capping material and shall
continue at a height not exceeding 7 feet
to its termination point at the Southwest
corner of Plaintiffs' property (the
Southeast corner of Defendants' property).,f
(Emphasis added)
Almost immediately upon completion of the wall plywood sheets
eight (8) feet high were placed against the wall in the area of
the plaintiffs windows.

These were later replaced by redwood and

green fiberglass barriers.
The plaintiffs argued these actions were a breach of
the terms of the stipulation.

The stipulation included those

terms implied from the express language of the stipulation as
having been intended by the parties.

The stipulation also

included the duty of good faith and cooperation required by law.
In State Auto & Casualty Underwriters v. Salisbury, 494
P.2d 529 (Utah 1972) the court said at 531.
Arising from what is commonly known and
accepted as to customs and experience in
everyday affairs of life, parties [to a
-8-

contact] each have the right to Assume that
the other will perform duties he agrees to
do with reasonable care, competence,
diligence and good faith even though such
terms are not expressly spelled out in the
contract.
The jury found by special interrogatories the purpose
and intent of the stipulation to be to "restrict obstruction to
light, view and air along the boundary between their properties in
a general way as well as to restrict the height of the wall
generally11.
This finding was not in conflict with the evidence.
The testimony of all parties about the initial discussions about
the wall related primarily to height, and td darkness in the
plaintifffs house and loss of her view.

Th^ height agreed upon of

five (5) feet provided primarily for a view out the windows and
was not to accomodate any other criteria.

It is the traditional

rule of the Utah court to review the evidende in the light
favorable to the findings of the jury and judgment entered, State
Auto, supra at 532.
The placement of the plywood and subsequent barriers
had the effect of breaching this intent and evidenced a lack of
good faith and cooperation.

It was not neceissary that the

contract expressly exclude all types of boundaries since "common
experience" would not lead individual neighbiors to expect plywood
and other barriers to be subsequently erecte|d between them when
the height of the boundary wall had been so arduously negotiated.

-9-

II.

THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY PROVIDED LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
GROUNDS TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF A NUISANCE.

A.
The jury finding of nuisance was based on jury
instructions that were consistent with the general view of spite
fence nuisance law and were not inconsistent with the law that
should be adopted by the Utah court.
The only Utah nuisance case cited by the defendants1
brief is the case of Rowley v. Marrcrest Homeowners Ass'n, 656
P.2d 414 (Utah 1982) where in clear dicta at 419 the court states:
As a general proposition, one who erects
an otherwise useless structure for the sole
purpose of injuring a neighbor makes an
improper tise of his property. Sundowner,
Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d 785
(1973), Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich 380, 37 N.
W. 838 (1888).

The plaintiffs1 believe that Rowley does not state the
correct law to be applied in this case.

For this reason, this

case and the evolution of the general proposition will be
discussed in detail.

The facts in spite fence cases are generally

very similar to the case at bar.
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In Sundowner, supra the parties had previously been in
litigation concerning alleged misrepresentations in the sale of a
motel property.

The parties were adjoining property owners.

One

party built a structure described as a "fenqe or sign" 85 feet in
length and 18 feet high approximately 2 feet from the adjoining
property owner's motel building, restricting the passage of light
and air to it's rooms.
The court noted that the older caises or English rule
were founded on the premise that the property owner has an
absolute right to use his property in any matter he desires.

This

rule was rejected by Burke v. Smith (also cilted by the Utah Court
in Rowley) which set forth what became known as the American Rule
on spite fences.

The rule' is most often expressed by quoting from

Burke supra at 37 N.W. 842.
But it must be remembered that no man
has a legal right to make malicious use of
his property, not for any benefit or
advantage to himself, but for the avowed
purpose of damaging his neighbor. To hold
otherwise would make the law a cofivienent
engine, in cases like the present^ to
injure and destroy the peace and comfort,
and to damage the property, of on$'s
neighbor for no other than wicked purposes
which in itself is or ought to be unlawful
. . . what right has the defendant, in the
light of just and beneficant principles of
equity, to shut out God's free air and
sunlight from the windows of his Neighbor,
not for any benefit or advantage to
himself, or profit to his land, biit simply
to gratify his own wicked malice ^gainst
his neighbor?
The facts of the Sundowner case are important!.

The defendant had

alleged that the wall was useful for advertising purposes.
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However, the court found that the wall did not serve a useful
advertising purpose although it was used for advertising and
ordered it reduced to six feet in height.
The facts illustrate that the courts generally have
expoused the dicta of Burke concerning no useful purpose while in
fact making a finding of intent and disregarding an arguable
"useful purposes".
This is evident in a series of Wyoming cases in which
the Wyoming court ultimately disgarded the Burke languge and
adopted a more realistic statement of the law.
In Erickson v. Hudson, 249 P.2d 523 (Wyo 1952), the
litigants were adjoining property owners in Evanston, Wyoming, who
had previously been involved in adjudication over the location of
their property line.

The fence complained of was constructed to a

height of 6-1/2 feet and to within 5-1/2 inches of the eaves of
the house and within 13 inches of a wall.

The side facing the

neighbor was painted with creosote which caused the plaintiff to
become ill.

The houses were only 6 to 7 feet apart.

The justification for the fence was that it was built
on the defendant's own property, served a useful purpose of
providing privacy and kept peace with his neighbors.
The court made this final determination at 532.
That the defendants sought privacy and
peace may be true, but the beneficial
purpose of the fence in that connection, if
any, at least as to the height of it is far
out of proportion to the injury inflicted.
Common sense dictates that it would be
offensive to any neighbor whatever. The
cause and underlying reason for the
erection was the ill-feeling toward the
plaintiffs . . .
-12-

The court upheld an order reducing the fence to the
height of the window sills.
A subsequent Wyoming case Schork v. Epperson, 287 P.2d
467 (Wyo 1955) was substantially similar in facts: a solid wooden
fence was erected 9 feet high and came close to the eves of the
house preventing it from receiving sunshine until almost noon and
compelling the plaintiffs to use electric lights during the day.
The defendants claimed it was useful as a windbreak and as a
snowfence.
The Wyoming court cited the Utah case of Dahl v. Utah
Oil Refining Co., 71 Utah 1, 262 P. 269, (1927) and Cannon v.
Neuberger, 1 Utah 2d 396, 268 P.2d 425 (1954) for the proposition
that "the test of whether the use of the property constitutes a
nuisance is the reasonableness of the use cqmplained of in the
particular locality and in the manner and under the circumstances
of the case", Dahl supra at 273.
The court then noted that spite fence cases have not
enjoyed this broader definition of nuisance.

The court criticised

the narrow interpretation of the American Rule set out in Burke
supra requiring that "malice must be unmixed with any benefit to
the party erecting the fence", Schork, at 470. The court cites
cases that have held that "liability ensues when malice is the
dominate factor and the usefulness of the structure is limited and
merely incidental".
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The court next examined the Restatement of the Law of
Torts, Sections 826 to 829, intentional invastion of anothers
land, which it notes does not adopt a "useful purpose" standard
but rather balances the utility of the conduct to the gravity of
the harm.
Finally, the Court in Schork adopts a balancing
standard

of it's own at 470,
The actor is liable "unless the utility
of the actor's conduct outweighs the
gravity of the harm."
The plaintiffs believe the history of the Wyoming

court's use of the American Rule and reasoning is pursuasive.

The

strict American Rule puts the plaintiff to the burden of
disproving a "useful purpose" under some artificial criteria when
infact it is obvious that a fence may be "useful", but that the
"use" was not the purpose.

Legal fictions create bad law, confuse

the jury and obsure the true issues of the case.
This view of the Wyoming court is consistent with the
Utah Statutory definition of Nuisance.

Section 78-38-1, Utah Code

Annotated provides:
Anything which is injurious to health,
or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property,
so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property, is a
nuisance and the subject of an action.
Such action may be brought by any person
whose property is injuriously affected, or
whose personal enjoyment is lessened by
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance
may be enjoined or abated, and damages may
also be recovered.
-14-

This statute has been applied to numerous other
nuisance circumstances such as Dahl, an Oil Refinery; Neuberger, a
question of trees constituting nuisance; Brough v. Ute Stampede
Assn., Inc., 105 U 446, 142 P.2d 670 (1943), a carnival adjacent
to a home; Wade v. Fuller, 12 U.2d 299, 365 P.2d 802 (1961),
operation of a drive-in cafe; and Ludlow v. Colorado Animal
By-Products Co., 104 U. 221, 137 P.2d 347 (1943)a rendering plant
in a farming community.

The cases developed a balancing of

interests tests in Utah, as best stated in Neuberger at 426:
. . . our court . . . has never
interpreted the first word of the statute
to mean "anything at all which [(is)] any
person considers to be offensive to the
senses'1 etc. Rather it has held that the
term "nuisance" is applied to "the
unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use
by a person of his property", and that
every person has a right to the reasonable
enjoyment of his property. As to what is a
reasonable use of one's property must
necessarily depend upon the circumstances
of each case for a use for a particular
way, in one localilty, that would be lawful
and a nuisance in another . . . The test of
whether the use of property consitutes a
nuisance is the reasonableness of the use
complained of in the particular locality
and in the manner and under the
cirumstances of the case.
This same test could be wisely applied in spite fence
nuisance cases as it has been done in Wyoming.

The reference in

Rowley to the American Rule and Sundowner, are contrary to the
statute and Utah case law.
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B.
The facts of the instant case clearly support the
finding of the jury that the fence was of no beneficial use or
purpose and that the fence was erected solely for the purpose of
annoying the plaintiffs.

This was the finding required by Jury

Instruction 21 which was modified by the Court to clarify this
point.

Thus the presence of Instruction 21 put the plaintiff to

the more severe test.

The jury was free to disregard as

unbelieveable the testimony of the defendants that the fence
served the useful purpose of providing them privacy.

Upon review

this Court must view the facts in light most favorable to the
findings of the jury, State Auto, supra at 532.
Jury Instruction 18 is arguably at odds with
Instruction 21. However, plaintiff believes that the two
instructions are consistent and merely clarify the American Rule;
i.e. whether a fence is installed solely for malice may require or
permit the jury to disregard possible uses that are not actual
uses.
Jury Instructions 15 and 16 accurately state the
definition of a nuisance generally as explained by the Utah
statute and Utah cases.

To the extent that Utahfs general law of

nuisance is more broad than the American Rule of spite fence
nuisance these instructions may apper inconsistent with
Instructions 18 and 21.

If this court were to adopt the American

Rule, the juryfs instructions would, nevertheless, not have been
unclear or in error.

The jury was instructed that for a fence to

be a nuisance it must be erected solely for purposes of malice.
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The general explanations of nuisance were subordinate to this
specific finding required by the instructions for a fence.

This

was not reversible error Morgan v. Mammoth Min. C o M 26 U 174, 72
P. 688 (1903); In re Richards Estate, 5 U.2d 106, 297 P.2d 542
(1956).
Plaintiff argues that if there was error in the
instructions, the error was the reference arfrd use of the American
rule rather than the better rule applied in other Utah nuisance
cases and expoused by the Wyoming court in ^chork, supra.

This

"error" was to the defendants1 favor and is not a basis for
reversal or remand.

III.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE JURY AND THE EVIDENCE EXCLUDED
WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS NOR BEYOND THE
PROPER DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT

The defendants in their brief argue at great length
that the trial court improperly excluded admissable evidence.

The

evidence that is thought to have been excludied was, infact,
usually not excluded, but merely limited either because of the
court's impatience that so much of such evidence had been admitted
throughout the proceedings or because the defendants1 counsel
failed to pursue the area further.
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The areas felt by defendants to have been inadequately
presented are identified in their brief as follows:
(a)

Plaintiffs alleged excessive summoning of the

(b)

Opinions of neighbors concerning the plaintiff's

police;

reputations for invasion of the privacy of others;
(c)

Privacy problems of the defendants requiring the

wall;
(d) (h) and (i)

Defendants' actions related to

possibly undermining the wall.
(e)

Telephone calls to building inspectors related to

(f)

The opinion of the plaintiff concerning the

the wall;

allegations in the Complaint; and
(g)

The opinion of the defendant concerning the intent

of the settlement stipulation relative to light and air.
As the defendants conceed in their brief, disputes
between neighbors are often unpleasant and lead to name calling
and mud slinging.

The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their actions

for defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress.
Their strategy was to preclude the type of bickering that would
have undermined the sympathies of the jury and prevented a
determination of the crucial issues.
This was also the burden of the trial court.

Rule 403

of the Utah Rules of Evidence recognizes the need for discretion
of the trial court to balance relevancy with the risks of
prejudice confusion, undue delay or needless presentation of
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cumulative evidence.

This discretion is not to be disturbed

unless it clearly appears that the trial court so abused it's
discretion that there was a likelihood that injustice resulted.
State v McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah, 1982).
The potential for prejudice, delay and confusion was
particularly high in this case because of the large number of
extraneous issues between the parties, the Uack of specific
complaints and temptation to introduce evidence of innuendo or
general conclusions as to character.

Plaintiffs believe the

complete record shows the court judiciously balanced the numerous
factors to see that justice resulted and that there was no abuse
of this discretion.
In specific response to the defendants individual
objections the plaintiff makes the following observations:
(a) and (e)

The specific objection of defendants is an

inability to introduce evidence that Mrs. Belhunin called the
police and building inspector often.
The plaintiff was questioned by defendant's counsel
concerning the calls to the building inspect&r.
without objection.

She testified

Counsel then asked about inspection papers.

Since the plaintiffs did not contend that th£ wall was built
without compliance, this question was objected to as being
irrelevant.

The objection was sustained and the defendants'

counsel moved to other areas of cross examination (T-390).
line of questioning was not renewed with any other witness.
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This

Mrs. Behunin did not testify on direct examination to
calling the police.

The court on it's own, objected to the

questions by defendants' counsel about police calls as being
beyond the scope of the questioning on direct testimony (T-402).
Prior to the courts objection Mrs. Behunin testified she had
called the police when given an obscene gesture by the defendant
and on quite a few occasions (T-401).

The court's objection did

not precluded the defendants from testifyincj on these matters on
direct or of asking other witnesses about police calls, but no
questions were asked.

The plaintiffs introduced the testimony of

a police officer, (T-422) called by the plaintiffs concerning a
loud music disturbance.

He testified the music was loud enough to

justify a complaint and that the defendant told the officer's
partner, "He didn't really care what [they] had to say, he was
going to do what he darn well liked" (T-424).

Again, following

this testimony, the defendants failed to offer testimony of their
own or other witnesses including any police officers or public
officials to testify that they received calls that were not
justified.
The court's single objection was correct.

The failure

to proceed further at a later time precluded the testimony, not
the court.
(b) and (c)

Plaintiffs' reputation for snoopiness.

The court permitted over 37 pages of testimony by five witnesses
concerning the problems the defendants had with the plaintiff.
At T-437 - 439 the defendants' counsel questioned Mr.
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Behunin concerning his activities near the wall and while the wall
was being built.
At T-454, and T-457, Mrs. Gallegos testified about
"problems" with the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs1 counsel objected.

Plaintiffs contended

that problems after the wall and barriers were erected were not
relevant to the question of motive for building the wall and
erecting the barriers.

Nevertheless, the court permitted the

defendant to ask about the plaintiffs' activities that justified
erecting the barriers in addition to the wall.
Mrs. Gallegos testified concerning one incident of Mr.
Behunin possibly looking over the wall in his back yard (T-457).
She also was allowed to testify about the plaintiffs coming to the
front yard when the defendants had quests (T-459).

She testified

about Mr. Behunin often walking between the wall and his
house,(T-461) and being on the roof when the defendants'
contractor was pouring a patio in the defendantsf back yard
(T-462-463).

Further questions were asked at concerning alleged

offensive actions by Mr. Behunin (T-468-469).
The defendants were allowed to call Mr. Hadehaim, the
contractor, who testified about Mr. Behunin watching them work on
the patio in defendants' back yard.

He testified that he worked

for 4 or 5 days and noticed Mr. Behunin watching once from the
roof and once tell an employee to not sit on the wall (T-475-479).
The defendants called Mr. Gallegos who was allowed to
testify that after the wall was erected the plaintiffs would go to
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the front yard when they had quests at their door (T-499).
directed to testify as to particular instances.

He was

He then testified

to two occasions he could recall (T-500-504).
The defendants called a witness, a neighbor, Mr. Kay
Snow who testified concerning his observation of the relationship
between the plaintiffs and the defendants.

He testimony was

general in nature as to types of activity he observed (T-526-527).
The defendants called as a witness a neighbor, Mr.
Edwin Christensen, who testified in a manner similar to Mr. Snow.
(T-500-532)
The defendants also called as a witness the persons who
lived in the defendants' home prior to them.

Their testimony as

to the reputation of the Behunins was not permitted.
knowledge except from 16 years prior.

They had no

The record already

established that the parties had no disputes or privacy problems
prior to the wall.
In rebuttal to all of the foregoing, the defendants
called the police officer whose testimony has been summarized and
Mrs. VanDongen, a neighbor.

She testified in a manner similar to

the other neighbors, Mr. Snow and Mrs. Christensen, concerning her
observation of the relations between the plaintiffs and
defendants. (T-439-440).
Thus, in summary it can be seen that defendants were
not precluded from introducing evidence of possible intrusive
behavior.

The jury had before it abundant testimony to conclude a

need for privacy.

The jury was apparently not pursuaded.
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(d) (h) and (i)

Testimony about plaintiffs1 actions

relating to possibly undermining the wall.

The defendants1

facination with the idea that the plaintiffs wanted to destroy the
wall continually frustrated the court.
permitted.

Abundant testimony was

Yet it became clear by all of defendants1 witnesses

that this testimony was not relevant to the defendants1 claims or
defenses to the extent of the testimony offered.

The record is

filled with testimony about watering the wall (T-475, 491,
535-536) or watering ground around the wall, (T-467-468, 479, 480,
527) shaking the wall (T-433, 466) or digging around the wall
(T-467-468) including pictures of water puddling.

Finally the

court restricted further testimony on this subject.

This is a

prime example of where evidence was limited because it was already
excessively permitted by the court.

As the court said it was a

"time waster".
(f) and (g)

The defendants tesitifed concerning their

understanding of the stipulation prior to the objections.
objectionable testimony was repetitious.

The

The testimony of the

plaintiff concerning the language of the complaint was properly
excluded as not having been her language but her attorney's which
she testified she hadn!t really read (T-397).
The foregoing detailed analysis of the record
demonstrates that the court did not abuse it's discretion in
ruling on the admissability of evidence.

The defendants had full

opportunity to present their evidence and defenses.

Thus the

errors alleged, if there were any, were not preducial so as to
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have a substantial influence on the verdict as required for remand
under Rules 103 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 61 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Stagmeyer v. Leathum Bros, Inc., 20
U.2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968) and McCardell, supra.

It is clear

that the jury chose not to believe the evidence presented by the
defendants but rather to believe the testimony of the plaintiffs.

IV.

THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF GRANTED IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

The Order of the Court granting injunctive relief is
made pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 19 of the
Utah Constitution providing that:

There shall be but one form of civil
action, and law and equity may be
administered in the same action.
This section as interpreted by the Utah Court in
actions seeking injunctive relief, provides that the determination
does «jof
by the jury of issues of fact and damages ^©xpreclude the court
from granting injunctive relief.

See Salt Lake City v. Anderson,

106 U 350, 148 P.2d 346 (1944).
As already cited, the provisions of Section 78-38-1
Utah Code Annotated provided that ". . .by judgment the nuisance
may be enjoined or abated11.

The language of the courtf s

Ordercarrying out the constitutional and statutory responsibility,
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merely echos the findings of the jury concerning it's
interpretation of the stipulation and the findings of nuisance.
The language is not overly broad.
The injunctive relief ordered is consistent with the
injunctive relief ordered in similar cases by the courts of
Wyoming in Hudson and Schork, supra; and the Utah court in Wade v.
Fuller, supra.

It is consistent with the policy of the court to

avoid duplicity of lawsuits and to grant relief on one action to
the extent possible.
The defendants cite no Utah authority for their
position that the injunction is a taking where the prescribed
author-fey is/nuisance, or prohibited by contract.

CONCLUSION
The finding of the jury should be sustained and the
injunction imposed by the court affirmed.

The stipulation was

properly interpreted to preclude the subsequent barriers.

The

finding of the jury was, consistent with law of spite fence
nuisance either under the American Rule which was properly
explained to the jury or under the broader nuisance provisions of
Utah law.

The Court should

abandon the dicta of Rowley and adopt

the better rule of Dahl and Neuberger.

DATED this £&-

day of March, 1985.

<

. ^ 7 rvtMu J
STEVEN F. ALDER"
Attorney for
Plaintiffs/Respondents

-25-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent were hand-delivered to:
Mr. Jeffrey L. Silvestrini
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
COHNE, RAPAPORT & SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
this

day of March, 1985.

-26-

